City of St. George v. Olsen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
City of St. George v. Olsen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Connie L. Mower; Attorney for Appellant.
Theodore W. Shumway; Gary G. Kuhlmann; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, City of St. George v. Olsen, No. 900143 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2535
50 
,A10 
DOCKET N 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JASEN RALPH OLSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900143-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Response to an Appeal from Final Judgment 
and Conviction of the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Washington County, St. George Department 
and Denial of a New Trial 
CONNIE L. MOWER #2339 
623 East 100 South 
P. 0. Box 1164 3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Tel. (801) 363-9345 
THEODORE W. SHUMWAY #2953 
GARY G. KUHLMANN #4994 
City of St. George 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Tel. (801) 634-5800 
Attorney for Appellant 
Attorneys for Respondent 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
I 0 1990 
Sec. 5-2-14(3), St. George City Code COURT ?EALS 
For a licensee or any employee or agent of a licensee to 
sell, furnish, dispose of, give, or cause to be sold, 
furnished, disposed of or given to a person under the 
age of twenty-one (21) years, or for a person under the 
age of twenty-one (21) years to buy, receive, have in 
possession or consume, beer or any alcoholic beverage. 
Sec. 32A-12-13, St. George City Code as adopted 
1. It is unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years 
to purchase, possess, or consume any alcoholic beverage 
or product, unless specifically authorized by this 
title. 
2. It is also unlawful for any person under the age of 21 
years to misrepresent their age, or for any other 
person to misrepresent the age of a minor, for the 
purpose of purchasing or otherwise obtaining an 
alcoholic beverage or product for a minor. 
Sec. 41-2-133, St. George City Code as adopted 
It is a Class B misdemeanor for a person to: 
1. display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have 
in possession any license knowing it is fictitious or 
has been cancelled, revoked, suspended or altered; 
2. lend or knowingly permit the use of a license issued 
to him, by a person not entitled to it; 
3. display or represent as his own a license not issued 
to him; 
4. fail or refuse to surrender to the division upon demand 
any license which has been suspended, canceled, or 
revoked; 
5. use a false name or give a false address in any 
application for a license or any renewal or duplicate 
of the license, or to knowingly make a false statement, 
or to knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise 
commit a fraud in the application; or 
6. permit any other prohibited use of a license issued 
to him. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 78-2a-3(2) (d) , the Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the Circuit 
Court. However, there is a question as to that jurisdiction with 
respect to certain issues raised in this appeal due to proceedings 
by the Defendant in the Circuit Court with respect to, and 
following the filing of, his notice of appeal. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Defendant was charged with possession or consumption of 
alcoholic beverages by a minor, misrepresentation of age by a minor 
for the purpose of purchasing alcoholic beverages, and possession 
of a fictitious identification, all in violation of the St. George 
City Code. The Defendant pled not guilty to such charges and was 
tried in absentia before the Fifth Circuit Court of Utah, St. 
George Department, on February 5, 1990. The Defendant was found 
guilty of the three offenses charged and was ordered to pay fines 
in the total sum of $455.00. The Defendant filed a Notice of 
Appeal on or about March 6, 1990. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider issues 
raised by the Defendant's Motion for New Trial based upon the 
2 
failure of the Notice of Appeal to specify an appeal from the 
denial of such motion. 
2. Whether the Defendant's Notice of Appeal allows this Court 
to consider the trial court's denial of the Motion for new Trial, 
or whether this Court is precluded from considering matters raised 
by the Defendant's Motion for New Trial. 
3. Whether this Court has jurisdiction over any issues raised 
by the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of his 
Motion for New Trial when it was filed after his Notice of Appeal. 
4. Whether the trial court properly denied the Defendant's 
motion to continue the trial and properly proceeded with a trial 
in absentia where the Defendant knew of the trial date, knew of the 
charges against him, and had communicated to the prosecutor the 
Defendant's intentional and voluntary waiver of his appearance and 
plea of guilty to Count I of the Information. 
5. Whether the trial court properly denied the Defendant's 
Motion for New Trial based upon the Defendant's knowledge of the 
charges against him, opportunity to appear at trial, and failure 
to appear at trial. 
6. Whether the evidence presented at trial supports the trial 
court's finding that the Defendant was guilty of the charges 
against him as contained in the Information. 
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7. Whether the Defendant can properly be convicted of 
misrepresentation of age for the purpose of purchasing alcoholic 
beverages as well as unlawful possession or consumption of 
alcoholic beverages, both in violation of the St. George City Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Although the Statement of the Case and Statement of the Facts 
presented by the Defendant is slanted in his favor, the City 
accepts such Statement of the Case and Statement of the Facts with 
the following facts added. 
1. At the time that the Defendant was issued the citation on 
November 24, 1989, the Defendant signed the citation and received 
a copy thereof. The citation clearly sets forth three charges 
against the Defendant. (R. 1) . 
2. On or about December 15, 1989, the Defendant filed a 
Request for Discovery with the City. (R. 5,6) The City responded 
to the discovery request on December 21, 1989, and as part of such 
response, provided the Defendant with a copy of the police report 
which clearly shows that the Defendant was cited for three 
offenses. (R. 8, Response to Request No. 5). 
3. The City prosecutor first talked with Defendant's attorney 
on the morning of February 5, 1990, the day of the trial. (Tr. p. 3 
1.6-8; R. 28) Defendant's counsel had previously left messages 
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with the City prosecutor!s office, failing, however, to indicate 
the reason for the call or what she was calling about. During the 
conversation on February 5, 1990, the City prosecutor indicated 
that he did not have the Defendant's file in front of him and that 
he was not familiar with the case. (Tr. p.3 1.8-10; R. 28) The 
Defendant's counsel discussed the matter with the City prosecutor 
and after the prosecutor refused to dismiss or modify the charge 
of minor in possession or consuming, an agreement was reached that 
the Defendant would plead guilty to that charge. (Tr. p. 3 1.13-
20; R. 28, 29) At the time of this discussion the City prosecutor 
was not aware that the Defendant had been charged with three 
separate offenses. (Tr. p.3 1.23-24; R. 31) 
4. At the time of the conversation on February 5, 1990, 
Defendant's counsel was also not aware that the Defendant had three 
charges against him. (Defendant's Response to Motion for Summary 
Disposition at page 3.) No discussion of the charges other than 
minor in possession or consuming occurred during the February 5, 
1990 conversation. (Tr. p.3 1.8-24) 
5. On February 15, 1990, the Defendant filed a Motion for 
New Trial based solely upon the Defendant's claim that he did not 
knowingly or intentionally waive his right to appear for trial. (R. 
17) The motion was denied on February 20, 1990. (R. 25) On March 
8, 1990, the Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 32) 
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Subsequent to filing of the Notice of Appeal, the Defendant on 
March 29, 1990, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with respect to 
the Motion for New Trial. (R. 41) The Motion for Reconsideration 
was denied on April 9, 1990. (R. 52, 53) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant has failed to properly perfect issues for appeal 
to this Court. The Defendant's Notice of Appeal is limited to the 
judgment entered against the Defendant on February 5, 1990, Thus, 
issues raised with respect to the denial of the Motion for New 
Trial are not before the Court. As the Defendant filed his Notice 
of Appeal prior to filing his Motion for Reconsideration of the 
Motion for New Trial, any issues raised by the Motion for 
Reconsideration are likewise not before this Court. Finally, as 
the Defendant failed to raise questions as to the sufficiency of 
evidence, double jeopardy and denial of a continuance with the 
trial court at the time of filing the Motion for New Trial, and did 
not raise such issues at trial, such issues are not preserved for 
consideration herein. 
Should the Court find that there are issues regarding the 
trial court's judgment, such judgment should be sustained as the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to continue 
the trial or in proceeding with the trial in absentia where the 
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Defendant knew of the trial date and his need to appear and 
voluntarily failed to do so. Likewise, should the Court find that 
issues raised by the Defendants Motion for New Trial are properly 
before this Court, the Court should find that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the Defendant a new trial based 
upon the Defendant's knowledge and actions in failing to appear at 
trial. 
Finally, based upon the plain reading of the statutes under 
which the Defendant was charged, this Court should sustain the 
trial court's finding that the Defendant is guilty of both 
possession or consumption of alcoholic beverages by a minor and use 
of false identification for the purpose of purchasing alcoholic 
beverages. The elements necessary to prove these offenses are 
distinct and one is not a lesser included offense of the other. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Defendant's Actions with Respect to Filing His 
Motion for New Trial, His Notice of Appeal and His 
Motion for Reconsideration, Bring This Court's 
Jurisdiction Into Question. 
A question regarding this Court's jurisdiction and scope of 
review is raised by the Defendant's Notice of Appeal. Rule 3(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of 
appeal designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed 
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from. The purpose of a notice of appeal is to advise the opposing 
party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment or 
order in the case. Additionally, a "Respondent is entitled to know 
specifically which judgment is being appealed." Hunley v. Stan 
Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798,800 
(1964)(Appeal dismissed where notice of appeal designated wrong 
judgment) . The rule that an appeal is limited to the matter 
designated in the notice of appeal has been widely followed. See 
Wendling v. Southwest Savings and Loan Association, 143 Ariz. 599, 
694 P.2d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), Lee v. Lee, 133 Ariz. 118, 
649 P.2d 997 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982), Jiminez v. Jiminez, 55 Or. App. 
221, 637 P.2d 928 (1981), Collins v. Union Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, 624 P.2d 496 (Nev. 1981), Mabrey v. Mobil Oil Corp., 
84 N.M. 272, 502 P.2d 297 (1972), Welch v. State, 390 P.2d 35 (Nev. 
1964), and State v. Reed, 190 Kan. 376, 375 P.2d 588 (1962). 
In this case, the Defendant's Notice of Appeal indicates only 
that the appeal is from "that judgment and conviction rendered 
against [Defendant] on the 5th day of February, 1990." Thus, 
Defendant is limited herein to presenting issues relating to the 
judgment of the trial court and is precluded from raising issues 
regarding the denial of the Motion for New Trial. 
Should the Court determine that the Defendant may properly 
question the trial court's denial of the Motion for New Trial, a 
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review of such issues should be limited. On February 15, 1990, the 
Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial with the trial court, the 
only issue raised as a basis for seeking a new trial was the 
Defendant's failure to appear at trial. The Defendant claimed the 
right to a new trial based upon his claim that he did not knowingly 
or intentionally waive his right to a be present at trial. The 
trial court, finding that the Defendant was aware of the three 
charges against him, and noting that plea bargains are not legally 
effective unless approved by the court, denied the motion. 
It is well established that in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, an appellate court will not review matters raised 
for the first time on appeal where no timely and proper objection 
was made in the trial court. State v. Steqqell, 660 P. 2d 252, 254 
(Utah 1983) . See also State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26, 29 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), State v. Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985), 
and, especially, State v. Smith, 776 P. 2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
wherein it was also noted that this Court would not review issues 
for the first time on appeal which had not been raised in the trial 
court through a motion to arrest judgment. Id. at 931, f.n.l. 
Finally, in Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association, 24 Utah 2d 
292, 470 P.2d 393 (1970), the court stated "No motion for a new 
trial was made by plaintiff, and so the trial court was not given 
the opportunity to correct the verdict rendered by the jury. An 
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appellate court ought not to do that which was not requested of the 
trial court." Id. at 396. 
In this case, the only issue raised by the Defendant through 
his Motion for New Trial dealt with whether he had knowingly and 
intentionally waived his right to be present at trial. Based upon 
such limited request and the above case law, if the denial of the 
Motion for New Trial is to be reviewed at all, this Court should 
limit its review to no more than the issue of the Defendant's 
failure to appear at trial and should not address the sufficiency 
of the evidence and other issues raised by Defendant in his brief. 
As a final matter of jurisdiction, it should be noted that 
the Defendant, after filing his Notice of Appeal filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Motion for New Trial. The trial court 
denied the motion noting that there was no provision for rehearing 
on the Motion for New Trial and that the Motion for Reconsideration 
was not timely as a motion for new trial. It has been held that 
an untimely Motion for Reconsideration has no effect upon the 
finality of the judgment rendered by the trial court or the running 
of time for an appeal. Transamerica Cash Reserve Inc. v. Hafen, 
723 P.2d 425, 426 f.n.2 (Utah 1986). Additionally, it has been 
held that a trial court is without power to alter its prior ruling 
upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration which is, in 
essence, the same motion for new trial. State v. McMullen, 764 
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P.2d 634 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), Thus, should this Court determine 
that it has jurisdiction over this appeal despite the problems set 
out above, any matters considered by the trial court or raised by 
the Defendant with respect to the Motion for Reconsideration are 
not properly within the Court's jurisdiction on this appeal. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Defendant's Motion 
to Continue the Trial Made at the Commencement of Trial. 
After the Court had scheduled four arraignment dates for the 
Defendant between November 27, 1989 and December 15, 1989, the 
Defendant's counsel entered a plea of not guilty on December 18, 
1989. On January 11, 1990, a notice setting trial for February 5, 
1990 was sent to the parties. On the morning of trial Defendant's 
counsel contacted the City prosecutor to discuss the case. At such 
time, it appears that neither the City prosecutor nor Defendant's 
counsel were aware that three charges were pending against the 
Defendant. During their conversation the Defendant's counsel 
agreed to transmit to the City prosecutor a signed waiver and entry 
of plea of guilty to the charge of minor in possession or 
consuming. Later that afternoon, and prior to trial, the City 
informed the office of Defendant's counsel of the other pending 
charges. The secretary to Defendant's counsel requested that the 
City seek a continuance of the trial. At the commencment of trial, 
the Defendant's request for continuance was communicated to the 
court. The court, after reviewing the file and the Defendant's 
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failure to appear at the prior arraignments, denied the 
continuance. The Defendant now argues that the court's failure to 
grant the continuance was erroneous since the Defendant did not 
voluntarily absent himself from the trial. 
It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, 
that the granting of continuances is at the 
discretion of the trial judge, whose decision 
will not be reversed by this court absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion. State v. 
Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 1093 (1975). Abuse 
may be found where a party has made timely 
objections, given necessary notice and made 
a reasonable effort to have the trial date 
reset for good cause. Griffiths v. Hammon, 
Utah, 560 P.2d 1375 (1977). 
State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). 
The facts presented to the trial court at the time of the 
request for continuance certainly justified the court's exercise 
of discretion in denying the continuance. The record revealed that 
the Defendant had failed to appear, for various personal reasons, 
at several arraignments. The Defendant had received notice of the 
trial, had received a copy of the citation setting forth the 
charges against him, during the discovery process had received a 
copy of the police report setting forth the three charges against 
him, and an information has been filed against him setting forth 
the three charges. No contact was made by the Defendant with the 
City prosecutor until shortly before trial. It is obvious that the 
Defendant did not intend to appear at the time of trial since 
12 
telephone contact was made on the morning of trial from an attorney 
in Salt Lake and the trial was being held in St. George. 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
a defendant has a right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel in all cases. The Defendant is to be personally present 
at the trial except that in prosecutions for offenses not 
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the 
trial after notice to the defendant of the time for trial will not 
prevent the case from being tried, and a verdict or judgment 
entered therein has the same effect as if defendant had been 
present. 
Despite the Defendant's claims, it is clearly evident that the 
Defendant here received notice of the date and time for trial. The 
Defendant's failure to appear was based simply upon the fact that 
he had entered what he thought to be a plea arrangement with the 
City. However, the Defendant knew that more than one charge was 
involved, and he should not be allowed to rely upon his failure to 
deal with all three charges as grounds for claiming his non-
appearance was not voluntary. This is not a case where the 
Defendant's counsel advised him that the trial would not go forward 
or did not advise him of the trial date. Rather, the burden was 
placed on the Defendant, the person knowing the charges against 
him, to be present at trial or otherwise deal with the charges. 
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The Defendant's reliance on the discussed plea arrangement as a 
basis for not attending the trial should not be found to justify 
his non-appearance. Plea bargains between the parties are not 
binding until approved by the court. Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Thus, the arrangement between counsel was 
simply a proposal to be made to the court and, obviously, if the 
court had denied the plea bargain, the trial would be held as 
scheduled. Despite this, the Defendant and his counsel took upon 
themselves the risk of non-appearance and should now be held to 
such actions. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Defendant's Motion 
for A New Trial Based Upon the Circumstances of the Case. 
Should this Court find it proper to review the trial court's 
denial of the Defendant's Motion for New Trial, such denial should 
be upheld. The decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter 
of discretion with the trial court and such decision will not be 
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Williams, 
712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). In the case at hand, the Defendant 
filed his motion for new trial based solely upon the grounds that 
he did not knowingly or intentionally waive his right to appear for 
trial. In support of the motion for new trial the Defendant's 
counsel submitted an affidvait setting forth her involvement in 
this case and the conversations which she had with the City 
prosecutor. The affidavit states that on or about December 15, 
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1989 the Defendant advised her that he was scheduled for 
arraignment on his criminal charges that day. Defendant's counsel 
then filed a written plea of not guilty to the charges. Thus, it 
appears that the Defendant clearly knew that there was more than 
one criminal charge pending against him. The affidavit further 
sets forth that the Defendant's attorney received notice of the 
February 5, 1990 trial some time subsequent to December 15, 1989. 
Yet, as has been set forth herein, the City prosecutor's first 
conversation with the Defendant's counsel was on the day of trial. 
The right of a criminal defendant to appear and defend in 
person at all stages of trial may be waived by the defendant's 
voluntary absence from trial. State v. Glenny, 656 P. 2d 990,991 
(Utah 1982) . Voluntariness is determined by considering a totality 
of the circumstances. State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) . In cases where it is argued that the defendant was 
not voluntarily absent from trial, "it is generally held that the 
defendant cannot by his voluntary act invalidate the proceedings." 
State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah 1982). In Wagstaff, supra, 
this Court, citing State v. Aikers. 87 Utah 507, 51 P. 2d 1052, 1056 
(1935), noted: 
It is not only the right of the defendant to 
be present, but is a duty which the statute 
imposes upon him, and he usually will not be 
permitted to take advantage of his own 
misconduct when he has voluntarily absented 
himself from the trial. It is one thing 
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for him to absent himself when he is at 
liberty and can voluntarily do so, and 
quite another thing for the court to 
deprive him of any substantial right 
against his protest . . . 
A defendant is entitled to be safeguarded 
in every constitutional right, but should 
not be permitted to so juggle with such 
rights as to embarrass and delay the 
courts or to defeat the ends of justice. 
Waastaff, 772 P.2d at 990. 
Nothing in the Motion for New Trial indicates any agreement 
between the parties with respect to the three charges pending 
against the Defendant. The Defendant does not assert that the City 
in any way agreed to dismiss two of the charges based upon the 
Defendant's plea of guilty to possession of alcohol by a minor. 
Thus, had the Defendant wished to contest the other charges he was 
required to appear at trial. However, the Defendant made no effort 
to appear at trial and, indeed, with respect to Count I, 
voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally waived his right to appear 
at such trial. Nothing in the Motion for New Trial cited 
deficiencies in the evidence or other causes for the granting of 
a new trial. The trial court reviewed the evidence and denied the 
Motion for New Trial since the Defendant was aware from the 
citation that three charges were pending and since plea bargains 
are not legally effective until approved by the court. Such a find 
was not an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. 
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D. The Evidence Produced At Trial Was Sufficient to 
Establish the Guilt of the Defendant on the Charges 
Against Him. 
Should the Court find that the Defendant has properly reserved 
for appeal the question of the sufficiency of evidence at trial, 
this Court should find that the evidence is sufficient to uphold 
the trial court's judgment. "When challenging the findings of fact 
of the trial court on appeal, the appellant must show that the 
findings of fact were clearly erroneous. In order to show clear 
error, the appellant must marshall all of the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support against an attack." State v. Moosman, 135 
Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah 1990). In reviewing the trial courts 
judgment, "the function of this court 'is not to determine guilt 
or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the 
credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given defendants 
testimony."1 State v. Gorlick, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1979), 
Rather, where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, this 
court will: 
Review the evidence and all inferences which 
may be reasonably drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the verdict. State v. 
Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). "When 
there is any evidence including reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, from 
which findings of all the requisite elements 
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of the crime can be reasonably made, [the 
Court] inquiry stops, and [the Court] 
sustain[s] the verdict." State v. Gehring, 
694 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1984). 
State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 132 (Utah 1986). The Court will not 
substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, State v. 
Sparks, 672 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds, 
State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987), and the verdict 
will not be overturned unless there is a clear showing of lack of 
evidence or that the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds could not reasonably believe the 
defendant had committed a crime. State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 
412 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). See also State v. Berowerff. 777 P. 2d 
510, 511 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Defendant herein claims that the evidence at trial was 
insufficient to (1) prove that the crimes occurred in St. George 
and (2) prove the Defendant's culpability for possession of a false 
identification. 
The City does not dispute that as part of its case, it must 
prove that the Defendant possessed or consumed alcoholic beverages, 
and used a false identification to purchase alcoholic beverages, 
within the boundaries of the City. Indeed, such was proven at 
trial. In reviewing the facts and inferences presented to the 
trial court in the light most favorable to the findings of that 
court, it is evident that the findings were not clearly erroneous. 
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At trial, the officer testifying on behalf of the City stated that 
he observed the Defendant in the parking lot of a 7-11 located at 
Dixie Downs Road and Sunset. The Defendant was running across the 
parking lot carrying a sack and cans of beer were spilling out of 
the sack onto the parking lot. The Defendant jumped into a vehicle 
which then pulled out onto Sunset in an eastbound direction. The 
officer immediately made a traffic stop at that location. (Tr. p.5 
1.13-15, 21-p.6 1.16)• 
The intersection of Dixie Downs Road and Sunset lies within 
the boundaries of the City of St. George. A vehicle traveling 
eastbound on Sunset is traveling toward the City Center. This 
would be clearly evident to the judge hearing the case since he has 
been a resident of this area for many years. The judge certainly 
could appropriately take judicial notice of the locations testified 
to as being within the boundaries of the City of St. George. See 
Rule 201, Utah Rules of Evidence, State v. Campbell, 500 P. 2d 801, 
805 (Mont. 1972), State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. 377, 430 P.2d 139, 
142 (1967) . It is also clearly evident from the facts presented 
that the Defendant was in possession of alcohol at the location 
where the officer observed and stopped him. 
The testimony establishes that the Defendant was a minor. (Tr. 
p.7 1. 19-22). As the Defendant stepped out of the vehicle, he 
tossed an identification card with his picture on it onto the 
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ground under the truck. (Tr. p.6 1.21-p.7 1.1). The 
identification card had a date of birth on it indicating that he 
was over 21 years of age. (Tr. p. 7 1. 1-4). The Defendant 
admitted to the officers that he had used the identification card 
to purchase beer (Tr. p. 8 1.6-9) at a location up the road (Tr. 
p. 11, 1.1-5, 10-13). The evidence further presented indicated that 
the Defendant had been drinking or was intoxicated (Tr. p. 8, 1. 
13-15; p. 10, 1. 5-13). 
Based upon the evidence presented to the court and properly 
taking notice as to the locations discussed, the court determined 
"it appears abundantly clear from the evidence that the Defendant 
is guilty of all three charges and I find him guilty of all three 
counts." (Tr. p.12, 1. 5-7). The evidence and inferences viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict clearly establish that 
the evidence was sufficient to find the Defendant guilty of the 
charges against him. 
E. The Doctrine of Double Jeopardy Does Not Bar A 
Conviction of the Defendant for Both Misrepresentation 
of Age and Possession or Consumption of Alcohol by a 
Minor. 
The Defendant argues that the doctrine of double jeopardy 
prohibits the Defendant in this case from being convicted of both 
possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor and 
misrepresentation of age for the purpose of purchasing alcohol by 
a minor. The Defendant argues that the ordinances under which the 
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Defendant was charged makes a minor in possession or consumption 
of alcohol a lesser included offense of misrepresentation of age 
by a minor for the purpose of purchasing alcohol. Should the Court 
determine that this issue was properly reserved for appeal by the 
Defendant, the Court should find that the conviction of the 
Defendant on both counts was proper. A review of the ordinance, 
and the state statute from which it is derived, reveals that no 
jeopardy bar exists. A reading of the ordinance establishes that 
the two acts are distinct and constitue grounds for separate 
convictions. Sec. 32A-12-13 of the St. George City Code as adopted 
states that it is unlawful for a minor to possess or consume 
alcoholic beverages. The Ordinance then states "(2) it is also 
unlawful for any person under the age of 21 years to misrepresent 
their age for the purpose of purchasing . . . an alcoholic beverage 
or product". (emphasis added) The plain and common meaning of the 
word "also" as used in the ordinance is "besides; in addition to; 
too." Websters Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1989. Thus, the 
ordinance provides that in addition to it being unlawful for a 
minor to possess or consume alcoholic beverages, it is also 
unlawful for a minor to misrepresent his age for the purpose of 
purchasing alcoholic beverages. 
Obviously a minor may possess or consume alcoholic beverages 
without using a false identification to purchase them. Equally, 
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a minor may present a false identification for the purpose of 
purchasing alcoholic beverages without ever being in possession of 
or consuming alcoholic beverages. Different elements must be 
proved in order to convict a defendant under the separate 
provisions. Nothing in the ordinance or the fact that the 
ordinances operate in conjunction with each other, would evidence 
that one of the sections is a lesser included offense of the other. 
Since the ordinance supports separate offenses and separate 
convictions, the Defendant was properly convicted of both offenses 
and can be fined with respect to each. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's limited Notice of Appeal, limited Motion for 
New Trial and actions in the trial court subsequent to the filing 
of the Notice of Appeal defeat this Court's jurisdiction over this 
appeal. However, should this Court find jurisdiction over the 
original appeal, it is evident from the facts presented and the 
arguments made herein that the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in denying the Defendant's motion to continue the trial 
and properly proceeded with the trial in absentia based upon the 
Defendant's knowledge of the charges against him, knowledge of the 
trial date, and voluntary absence from the trial. No one precluded 
the Defendant from appearing at the time of trial and the decision 
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not to appear was wholly that of the Defendant based upon knowledge 
of the circumstances of the case. 
It is further evident as set forth above, that the trial court 
properly denied the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial again based 
upon the Defendant's knowledge and opportunity to appear at trial 
and his failure to do so. The evidence presented to trial court 
in a light favorable to the judgment show that there was sufficient 
evidence, together with the inferences drawn therefrom, to find the 
Defendant guilty of the charges against him. Nothing in the record 
or the arguments of the Defendant would show that the court's 
judgment was clearly erroneous. Finally, the Defendant was 
properly convicted of the separate offenses of possession or 
consumption of an alcoholic beverage and misrepresentation of age 
in order to purchase an alcoholic beverage, based upon the facts 
presented and the admissions of the Defendant. Therefore, the City 
respectfully requests that this Court uphold the conviction of the 
Defendant as found by the trial court, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this H~~ day of September, 1990. 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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